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“THINGS DONE BY HALVES”
Observations from America’s First Great-Power
Competition
Benjamin F. Armstrong

T

he return of great-power friction and competition to the world’s oceans has
initiated a good deal of self-reflection in naval and maritime circles. The
U.S. Navy, in particular, has begun to reassess how it approaches the tactical and
operational questions of establishing sea control during wartime. At the same
time, the Royal Navy (RN) seeks to understand how Britain’s departure from the
European Union will change its role in world affairs, and Japan continues to adjust its defense policies and the norms of its naval involvement in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. These are just a few of the shifting dynamics among the United
States and its maritime allies.
A great deal of the official U.S. response to the developing power dynamics of
the twenty-first century is focused on capability for conventional, or nation-state,
warfare. Yet, concurrently with calls for developing greater lethality and greater
high-end naval capability, observers have identified a second challenge: maritime
conflict outside the boundaries of peer combat, or short of the threshold of highCommander Benjamin F. Armstrong, USN, is end warfare.
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France, illuminates key questions for strategists and planners considering the
interactions among great powers.
Our contemporary National Defense Strategy assures readers that the world
has entered an era of renewed “great-power competition.” Unfortunately, much
of the strategic and national-security writing that has adopted the phrase then
immediately turns the discussion to the ability to conduct or deter peer-combat
operations. Over centuries, however, maritime conflict short of declared war or
open hostilities has been a fundamental part of the competition and maneuvering
among powerful nations. Rather than looking only at our immediate past, or at
most at the history of the post–world war era, strategists must open their aperture
to a wider understanding of how the international dynamics of earlier eras might
inform what great-power competition means for military and naval forces beyond
great-power war. For the purposes of this article, debates over the theoretical
and definitional constructions of gray zone, hybrid, asymmetric, and other labels
are less important than seeking to understand how this history can inform our
understanding of the present and our thinking about the future.1
Concepts surrounding the advancement of hybrid war or conflict in the
gray zones—or whichever contemporary buzzword is a strategist’s or planner’s
favorite—have developed from Russian activity in the Black Sea region and Chinese activity in the South China Sea.2 Much of the writing implies that modern
Russian, Chinese, and Iranian efforts have introduced something new to the
maritime world. Admiral James G. Stavridis has written that “the fundamental
idea of hybrid warfare is to find the space short of clear-cut military action with
direct and recognizable tactical, operational, and strategic impact.”3 He suggests
that the maritime versions of these conflicts will be conducted in the coastal or
littoral regions of the world and will involve both naval “gray-hull” warships and
civilian vessels. Other commentators have pointed out that the mixing of lawenforcement responsibilities with more-traditional naval missions complicates
the situation for naval planners who think in Mahanian terms of decisive sea
battles or Corbett-inspired bombardment and power projection ashore.4 Despite
the fact that some identify these hybrid or gray-zone conflicts and competition as
a particularly complicated and somewhat unprecedented change to the maritime
world, they actually are nothing new to naval history.
The very beginning of the history of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps is as
good a place as any to take up an examination of unconventional conflicts, irregular operations, and great-power competition. The conflict between the United
States and France from 1798 to 1800 was, after all, a maritime conflict, caused by
great-power friction, that remained short of declared war. It led the U.S. Congress
to form the Department of the Navy and to outfit and deploy U.S. warships for
the first time. Originally known as “the war with France,” the conflict became
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
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known more commonly in the twentieth century as the Quasi War, and the new
nomenclature suggested its unusual and unconventional nature.5 By looking back
on the U.S. Navy’s first conflict—an undeclared war that occurred in the gray area
between peace and war, but resulted in both combat among nations and fighting
against nonstate groups in a hybrid manner—observations emerge that may help
today’s strategists and planners examine our modern challenges. Understanding
the long history of American involvement in maritime operations short of declared war will lead to better-informed questions to help us understand our contemporary challenges, and will help us develop twenty-first-century approaches.
A WAR THAT WAS NOT A WAR
Today, the history of the Quasi War is largely unknown to naval planners and
national-security professionals. It also lacks a wide body of literature from academics and historians themselves. The Barbary Wars of early American history
have attracted a cottage industry of recent publishing on the topic, from academics to Fox News hosts—even sportswriters. The bicentennial of the War of 1812
also brought a wealth of recent scholarship on that declared war. In contrast, in
the past half century there has been only a single book about the U.S. Navy and
the Quasi War: Michael Palmer’s excellent Stoddert’s War. As a result, returning
to the historical primary sources, alongside the work of Palmer and older and
related scholarship, can offer a useful and generally unfamiliar case study for the
twenty-first century.
The French Revolution was an enormous event in world history, with effects
that rippled across oceans. In the still-infant United States, the uprising that
overthrew and executed Louis XVI created both international and domestic
political problems. Britain’s reinitiation, in the aftermath of the Revolution, of
its intermittent eighteenth-century wars with France put the United States in the
middle. The revolutionary government (known as the Directory) demanded that
the United States fulfill its responsibility to France, in accordance with the alliance
that had helped Americans win their own independence. However, President
George Washington did not want the two great powers of Europe—each of which
had constituencies and supporters in the United States—pulling the young nation
into a war it could not afford, economically or politically. Instead, Washington
followed a circuitous line of diplomatic reasoning to escape the alliance that had
helped ensure his own victory at Yorktown. His administration, claiming that
the country’s treaty had been with the recently guillotined Louis, explained that
the alliance had died with the king, and that as a result the United States had no
responsibility to support revolutionary France.6
The U.S. government tried to walk the fine line of neutrality, while at the same
time American merchant traders set sail to carry supplies to both sides in the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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conflict. American merchants knew that when great powers were at war they
could make high profits carrying cargoes under a neutral flag.
The Directory, however, also realized Americans’ profit motives. Following
Washington’s declaration of neutrality, the French abrogated the 1778 treaty with
the United States. In doing so, it went beyond simply ending the alliance, also
repudiating the treaty’s support for the American belief that “free ships make
free goods.” This uniquely American ideal claimed that a neutral flag protected a
ship from seizure regardless of whether the ship’s cargo constituted contraband
of war. Instead, France returned to the traditional interpretation of maritime law,
which believed that the destination of the cargo was what mattered in determining whether it was contraband and legal to seize, not who was carrying it.7
The 1794 commercial treaty between United States and Great Britain, which
became known as the Jay Treaty, was seen as yet one more insult to the French,
who interpreted it as an effort by the Americans to assist the British enemy.
The French accused American merchants of allying themselves with London,
and privateers and warships sailing under the tricolor opened up a campaign of
guerre de course (commerce raiding) against American ships in the Caribbean
and western Atlantic. 8 In June 1797, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering
would report to Congress that French privateers and cruisers had captured 316
American ships during the previous year.9
After the election of 1796, Washington turned over the presidency to John Adams. In an attempt to negotiate a solution, the new administration sent a diplomatic mission to Paris. Instead of a diplomatic success, the negotiators came back
with a story of solicitation of bribes and other covert dealings in what American
newspapers called the XYZ Affair.10
President Adams and Congress began putting the United States on a war footing.11 American political leaders authorized the final outfitting and deployment
of the U.S. Navy’s first three frigates. They appropriated funds to finish building
the second group of three frigates, whose construction an earlier Congress had
halted to save money, in 1794. They authorized the president to buy or build a
dozen small warships, of twenty-two guns or fewer. And finally, the legislature
formed the Department of the Navy, under the leadership of the newly created
Secretary of the Navy, to administer and lead naval operations against French
depredations.12 However, Congress did not pass a declaration of war. The forces
began to deploy in the summer of 1798, in what President Adams and Congress
both considered a defensive measure. Between Congress’s first authorization for
combat operations—ordering U.S. warships to engage armed French vessels in
the early summer of 1798—and the Convention of 1800—which ended the conflict in September of that year—the U.S. Navy deployed dozens of warships into
the Caribbean and western Atlantic.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
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FOUR OBSERVATIONS
In today’s maritime and military concepts and jargon, those ships’ mission can
be described quite accurately as carrying on a maritime hybrid conflict brought
on by great-power competition. Studying the records of the nascent American
naval force to examine how the ships operated during the Quasi War yields four
observations about the experience and how the Navy and its leaders approached
the conflict.
The remainder of this article will examine those four observations rather than
continue a chronological retelling of the story of the war.13 These observations
can help inform our understanding of how naval forces interact within the alleged “gray zones” and offer a starting point for considering hybrid maritime
conflict in today’s era of great-power competition.
Presence Matters
Initially, the American warships deployed in 1798 patrolled only the nation’s
coastlines, but it was only a matter of weeks before Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert realized that these operations were insufficient—French ships
were attacking American merchant ships not only on the coast but also far from
their own shores.14 The French had established a privateering base, with supplies
and a court for adjudicating prizes, on their colonial island of Guadeloupe in the
Lesser Antilles.15
With Adams’s approval, Stoddert deployed the first small squadrons of warships into the Caribbean. Under the command of captains who were elevated
to the largely honorary title of commodore while in command of multiship
squadrons, these units patrolled the common transit routes, convoyed American merchant ships when they could gather them, and discovered and captured
French privateers. The first cruises were relatively successful, especially for a
naval service that had existed for only a matter of months. However, after several
months of continuous operations the ships required maintenance and supplies,
so commodores and their squadrons began returning home—whereupon the
French privateers surged back out of the safe havens they had found to renew
their attacks.16
Despite how it appears when you draw a straight line on a map from the
United States to the Caribbean, the Navy was operating far from home. Because
of the prevailing winds and currents, in the age of sail a ship leaving Chesapeake
Bay had to sail east into the Atlantic to find the winds that would allow it to tack
back to the southwest toward the Caribbean. This route resulted in a passage that
sometimes took American warships almost as long to get to the West Indies as it
took them to reach Europe.
When reports of the renewed French attacks reached American newspapers,
Stoddert and his commodores quickly realized that dealing with an adversary that
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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was using both state naval forces and privateers required constant presence.17 The
squadrons appeared to work well when they were on station. However, the Navy
could not wait for the first squadron to make it home before deploying a second.
The gap in presence allowed privateering attacks to surge and the admiralty court
at Guadeloupe to fill with cases as General Edme É. B. Desfourneaux, the French
governor, issued more commissions for privateers and reinvigorated the guerre
de course.18
So Stoddert worked with President Adams to design a rotational deployment
model for American squadrons. The secretary planned to order multiple squadrons to cover different parts of the Caribbean, and almost immediately he began
preparing the new squadrons needed to replace them. Stoddert then issued the
original commodores orders that forbade them to leave their stations until relief
arrived.19
The American experience in the Quasi War revealed that in a hybrid conflict
physical presence and patrolling constituted an important part of addressing the
ebb and flow of the threat. The occasional appearance of a warship, to prove the
simple possibility of presence, was insufficient; the number and types of adversary efforts quickly adapted to a strategy that left the seas uncontested, or at least
unpatrolled. The resulting solution was the U.S. Navy’s first use of rotational deployments—a method that has become a hallmark of modern global operations.
In the Quasi War, for the Navy to remain operationally and strategically effective,
the secretary had to ask, “How do I maintain regular, physical presence?”
Multiple Adversaries
When the U.S. Navy initiated operations in the Caribbean in the summer of 1798,
its leaders knew they would be facing at least two different adversaries.
The French Navy. France’s navy had a small but capable presence in the West
Indies to patrol the country’s colonies and protect its trade. This force, at different
points in the conflict, included several frigates, such as L’Insurgente, Volontaire,
and La Vengeance. They were roughly equivalent in capability to the American
frigates, although each ship was of slightly different size and had a slightly
different armament. These vessels represented a conventional threat, and one that
Americans had designed and armed their larger warships to be able to handle.20
French Privateers. But in addition to the French naval adversary were the French
privateers. Varying widely in size, these ships deployed from French colonies in
the Western Hemisphere to prey mostly on unprotected merchant ships from
both the United States and Great Britain. Guadeloupe, located in the heart of the
West Indies, was a primary base of operations.
The first privateer captured by an American warship was a typical example
of the threat. In the summer of 1798, the American naval ship Delaware, a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6

6

ARMSTRONG

Armstrong: “Things Done by Halves”—Observations from America’s First Great-P

73

twenty-gun converted merchantman commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur
Sr., confronted La Croyable off the coast of New Jersey. After a brief exchange
of gunfire the French surrendered, because they thought their opponent was a
British warship.21 The privateer was relatively small, with a schooner rig and a
total burden of approximately one hundred tons. Armed with a dozen small (sixpound) guns, it was strong enough to overtake any merchant ship, but the captain
knew he would have a hard fight against a warship.22
The rig and size of La Croyable, which generally matched the type built in
the United States known as Baltimore clippers, became familiar throughout
the nineteenth-century Caribbean as commerce raiders, not only as licensed
privateers, with government-issued commissions, but also as pirates, engaged in
maritime crime.23 These French privateers attacked hundreds of American ships,
although exact numbers are hard to come by. In 1827, Henry Clay collected the
records of 444 ships that were taken as prizes and brought into French ports,
yet that total does not include an unknown number that simply were robbed of
supplies, sunk, or burned without a French legal proceeding.24 The line between
privateer and pirate could be blurry.
Insurgents. Congress authorized combat operations against any armed French
vessel, whether a warship or a privateer. Yet as the American commodores began
operating throughout the West Indies, they discovered that there were other adversaries as well. In 1791, following news of the revolution in France, a slave revolt
and black insurgency had erupted in the colony of Saint Domingue (known today
as Haiti). Between 1791 and 1804, when Haiti declared its independence from
France, its island was in a near-constant state of civil war and violence.25 American merchants wanted to trade with the island, but the instability made it difficult.
The involvement of American merchants, despite initial government claims of
neutrality in the island’s fighting, and the fact that Haiti was still ostensibly French
pulled the U.S. Navy into the surrounding waters and embroiled its ships in the
local fighting. Aligning themselves with the revolutionary François-Dominique
Toussaint-Louverture (who sometimes returned his allegiance to France), American naval forces found themselves involved in operations against other factions
both ashore and in the littorals around the island. Forces loyal to André Rigaud,
who claimed to be fighting for France against Toussaint-Louverture, launched
raiding attacks from shore with small boats on the southern coast of the island.
Sometimes they sailed under the tricolor of France and sometimes under the red
banner commonly flown by pirates in the West Indies. American warships found
themselves in combat with both flags.26
Other Threats. In the closing year of the conflict other threats popped up as well.
The Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico began to involve themselves in the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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turmoil in Caribbean waters. The United States, France, Great Britain, and local
revolutionary forces all were pursuing their own agendas, and Spanish authorities
did not want to be left out. Reports of Spanish privateering and pirate bases began
to reach the American commanders, so they deployed ships along the Cuban
coast to patrol against the new threat.27
Thus, the commodores who commanded the American squadrons during the
Quasi War did not have the luxury of contending with a single naval adversary.
The French navy certainly posed the greatest danger in ship-versus-ship combat,
but French privateers perpetrated the bulk of the attacks on American shipping
and were the most important target of American operations. Yet despite the clear
congressional direction toward French forces, the commodores and leaders in
Washington could not ignore the civil war raging in Haiti, the insecurity it caused
in the maritime world, and the threats of other great powers entering the fray.
Initially, it seemed clear that America’s adversary was “the French,” but as the
conflict developed and introduced other threats American leaders had to ask the
question “Who are our adversaries, and what do they really want?” if they were
to come up with operationally and strategically effective plans.
Keeping an Eye on Allies and Partners
U.S. naval forces discovered that they had numerous adversaries in the Caribbean. However, they also could count on a number of potential partners in their
conflict with revolutionary France.
Toussaint-Louverture. While the Haitian leader appeared to present more
demands than offers of assistance, Toussaint-Louverture and his forces regularly
shared information and intelligence with American naval commanders and
diplomats. The civil war raged in Haiti among groups that at various times
received backing from British, Spanish, French royalist, and Directory forces.
At the start of the conflict between the United States and France, ToussaintLouverture had pushed back effectively against British and Spanish attempts to
gain control of Haiti. President Adams saw the opportunity to reestablish the
profitable commercial connections that Americans had had with the island
previously while encouraging Toussaint-Louverture to maintain the separation
between his territory and the government in Paris. The Americans, the British,
and Toussaint-Louverture signed a secret three-way alliance in June 1798, just as
the first American warships deployed into the Caribbean.28
The relationship with Toussaint-Louverture and Haiti was a conflicted one
for the Americans. The fighting on the island, and with it the possibility that
France would lose control of its most valuable colony in the Western Hemisphere,
was clearly a positive development for American interests. The territory that
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6

8

ARMSTRONG

Armstrong: “Things Done by Halves”—Observations from America’s First Great-P

75

Toussaint-Louverture held at Cap-Français (now Cap Haitien) and Port-auPrince offered places for American ships to obtain supplies such as food and fresh
water. And American merchants made sure the Navy and politicians understood
the future commercial benefits.29
But the Haitian Revolution also was a movement that started with a slave revolt. The racial politics of the era created massive fear that the revolution in Haiti
would lead to unrest within the slave populations of states such as Georgia and
the Carolinas. This fear was not unwarranted, since a Haitian veteran eventually
would play a role in the “German Coast Uprising” in Louisiana in 1811.30 There
also was a more desperate concern: that the French might launch an invasion of
the Southern American states using black troops, with the goal of fomenting a
full-fledged slave revolution.31 Yet despite the concerns of politicians and Southerners back home, American naval commanders in the Caribbean realized that
even an imperfect partnership could be beneficial, so they continued to work with
Toussaint-Louverture and his army.
Britain. The most powerful partner with which the United States worked during the Quasi War was the world’s dominant naval power: Great Britain. There
still were plenty of bad feelings between the two nations, which had gone their
separate ways barely more than a decade prior. Yet both were fighting revolutionary France, and many of their interests in the Caribbean appeared to coincide,
as witnessed by the joint secret pact with Toussaint-Louverture. During the first
summer of American operations, Secretary Stoddert and Vice Admiral George
Vandeput, who commanded British naval forces on the North America station,
created a shared set of codes and signals that allowed American and British captains to communicate and coordinate their efforts.32 At the start, the partnership
appeared to be a solid one, as the Navy Department distributed the signal book
and the commodores became aware of the common cause in Haiti. American
merchant ships sometimes sailed in convoys under British protection, and the
two nations’ warships passed intelligence to one another.33
However, it was not long before the relationship began turning sour, at least
occasionally. In the middle of November 1798, the American sloop of war
Baltimore (twenty-four guns) was escorting a convoy of merchant ships along
the north coast of Cuba toward Havana. As the convoy neared its destination
lookouts called out several sail on the horizon, and a squadron of British warships
approached. The squadron’s flagship, the ship of the line HMS Carnatic, hailed
Captain Isaac Phillips aboard Baltimore. Commodore John Loring asked him
to come aboard the British ship to consult, and the American officer crossed
in a boat. Phillips then was surprised when Loring refused to acknowledge his
papers and instead ordered a press-gang aboard Baltimore and the other ships
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of the convoy. The Royal Navy removed fifty-five seamen from the ships who
they alleged were British subjects. Although about half eventually were returned,
when the British sailed off they left Phillips impotent and embarrassed. Not long
after, Secretary Stoddert relieved him of command.34
Cooperation and conflict ebbed and flowed between the Americans and the
British throughout the war. Washington continued to receive reports of British
assistance to American merchants, and the passing of intelligence between warships remained a regular occurrence.35 However, there continued to be occasions
on which the interests of the two nations diverged, including incidents of impressment and the occasional capture of American merchant vessels.36
One of the most dramatic examples occurred on the island of Curaçao, a
Dutch colony, in the closing month of the conflict. In September 1800, French
forces launched an invasion of Curaçao by landing over a thousand troops,
who marched on the primary town, Willemstad. The port did heavy trade with
American merchants, and there were many American ships in the harbor as the
French approached.37 The U.S. warships Merrimack and Patapsco arrived to help
protect American interests, and the British sent the frigate HMS Nereide to ensure
that the French did not take control of the island. The Dutch initially appeared
ready to concede to the French, but with the arrival of the Anglo-American
naval forces and the subsequent landing of marines and sailors to strengthen the
defenses, they stood to fight the French attack. The two smaller American ships
positioned themselves so their guns could support the town’s small fortifications,
and the combined force successfully repulsed the attack, leading the French to
withdraw from the island.38
After the end of the combined defense, the American ships reembarked their
Marines and sailors and set off to patrol around the island to try to capture some
of the retreating French ships. While the Americans were gone, Captain Frederick Watkins landed British forces and annexed the town for Great Britain. He
placed seven American ships in quarantine under British control, took custody of
all the gold and cash of the American merchants in Willemstad, and sent orders
for RN ships to seize all American vessels in nearby waters. Watkins’s perception of British interests appeared to outweigh both his promise to the American
captains that he would protect American merchants and any appreciation for the
American contribution to the recent joint defense of the island.39
Alliances and partnerships are always a complicated part of military and naval
operations. In maritime conflicts short of declared war, awareness of the motives
and intentions of friends can be just as important as understanding adversaries.
Because these conflicts rarely appear existential, and because they remain below
many nations’ threshold of what they consider war, members of defensive
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
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alliances can be conflicted over their responsibilities to one another. The result
is that while multiple nations may become involved in the same conflict, they do
it for mixed reasons and with mixed rules of engagement. This may result in a
situation counterproductive to American interests.
In the Quasi War, Secretary Stoddert and his commodores discovered that
the partnership with Toussaint-Louverture produced both operational and
political limitations, alongside its local benefits. They also experienced a complex
relationship with the Royal Navy in the West Indies. As a result, during the Quasi
War American leaders repeatedly had to ask the question “What are my partner’s
motives, and do we have the same goals?”
The Role of Fleet Architecture
Congress founded the Department of the Navy to manage, organize, and command
the Navy for the Quasi War with France. In the opening month of the conflict, the
House and the Senate began authorizing the funds to build up the fleet. They
started with finishing the fitting out and commissioning of the first three frigates,
funding the completion of the second three frigates (whose construction had been
suspended to save money), and appropriating funds to build or buy a dozen ships
of up to twenty-two guns each. The Navy also took command of the cutters of the
Revenue Service, reflagging them as warships. The department aimed to obtain
converted merchant ships that were on the larger size and could carry around that
limit (twenty-two guns). Examples are Delaware and Baltimore, which the Navy
generally classified as sloops of war. These were the first ships deployed.40
What the commodores quickly discovered once they were on station, however,
was that larger ships with deep drafts had operational limitations. The squadrons
had to complete much of their required patrolling in archipelagic waters—the
littorals and shallows of the Caribbean. The privateers that made up the vast
majority of the French threat tended to have shallow drafts and fast schooner rigs,
which made them maneuverable and harder to chase with a big, square-rigged
warship. Instead of squadrons made up of a handful of large, strong ships, with
an overwhelming firepower of thirty-six to forty-four guns, the commodores
discovered that in their hybrid conflict they needed larger numbers of smaller
combatants.
Two of the warships purpose-built for the Quasi War demonstrated the value
of small combatants both in combat and in patrol and presence work. Built in
Baltimore, the schooners Experiment and Enterprise put to sea in 1799. Approximately eighty-five feet long, with a draft of just nine feet and a small armament of
twelve six-pound guns, Experiment first sailed with the squadron of Commodore
Silas Talbot in the waters around Haiti.41 Generally the same size and with the
same capabilities as the privateers it hunted but with a trained crew, Experiment
made more captures than any other ship deployed that year. Henry Spencer built
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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Enterprise on lines similar to those of its sister ship, and the second schooner
deployed a month after Experiment. In the ship’s first year of operations, its crew
captured eight privateers and recaptured eleven American ships that the French
had attacked and taken. These two small ships appeared more operationally effective than most of the frigates in the conflict. Commanded by aggressive young
officers, they quickly made reputations for themselves, and the name Enterprise
would enter American naval lore.42
The commodores realized they had a problem with the architecture of their
squadrons. They simply did not have enough small combatants to patrol their
areas of responsibility properly. To address the problem, many of them began using ships they had captured as American warships. This solution was a relatively
common practice of navies in the age of sail. For example, British captains regularly purchased ships they had captured back from prize courts and called them
“tenders” for their larger vessels. Placing a favorite junior officer in command
with a handful of sailors from the larger ship, commanders deployed the tenders
to patrol the littorals where the larger ship could not reach.43
American commodores such as Silas Talbot and Thomas Truxtun began using this method to augment their forces. In early 1799, within days of Constellation’s defeat of the larger French frigate L’Insurgente, Truxtun and his men also
captured the privateers Le Diligente and L’Union off Guadeloupe. Truxtun took
L’Union into American service and manned and deployed it as a tender to hunt
more privateers.44 Talbot followed the same path in the spring of 1800 when
when the Americans captured the French sloop L’Ampherite. Talbot renamed the
small ship Amphitheatre and placed it under the command of a young Lieutenant
David Porter, with orders that suspicious vessels “may be stop’d, and examined
strictly, and brought to the Constitution if she is near to be found.”45 Talbot also
used the American smuggler Sally, which his boats had captured along the beach
on the north coast of Hispaniola, as a raider to attack the privateer Sandwich in
the harbor of Puerto Plata.46
The American commanders in the Quasi War discovered that a balanced
architecture for their squadrons, including a range of capabilities in their ships,
was important for prosecuting an irregular campaign successfully. This is not to
claim that big warships, with the ability to conduct conventional naval battles, were
unnecessary; on the contrary, Truxtun and Constellation’s battles with the French
frigates L’Insurgente and Vengeance demonstrated that units deployed for hybrid
conflicts must be able to participate in high-end naval combat when threatened.
However, the administration back in Washington was not happy with the
commodores’ practice, and none of the tenders operated for more than a
couple of months.47 But the success of purpose-built small combatants such
as Experiment and Enterprise and the commanders’ desperate use of captured
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
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vessels as tenders to expand the low-end capability of their squadrons suggest
that in hybrid conflict a balanced force is vital to efficient operations.
CONSIDERING QUASI WARS
In his report to Secretary Stoddert on Constellation’s victory over L’Insurgente,
Thomas Truxtun lamented the complex character of the operations he was leading.
He wrote, “The french Captain tells me, I have caused a War with France, if so I
am glad of it, for I detest Things being done by Halves.”48 Maritime great-power
competition is complicated, rarely conforming to the popular image of great naval
battles and other decisive moments on the sea. Despite many officers’ dislike of
the circumstances, the very first U.S. armed conflict following independence was
a maritime hybrid conflict conducted with a backdrop of great-power competition
in the Caribbean. Close examination of the records of the conflict demonstrates
a number of parallels and similarities to the challenges that have been identified
in the study of irregular or hybrid conflicts and gray-zone operations in the
twenty-first century. In their study of these similarities, today’s scholars, policy
makers, and planners can start with four observations that might help guide their
questions about modern maritime insecurity and complexity.
The leaders of the early American navy discovered the necessity for presence
as an operating principle in maritime hybrid conflicts. Benjamin Stoddert, with
President Adams’s concurrence, developed the first use of rotational deployments
and other efforts to maintain physical presence. In the modern world, there is a
temptation to view the virtual presence of air- and subsurface-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms as providing a technological solution
for the twenty-first century. Yet the physical presence of surface combatants is
likely to be just as important as it was two centuries ago, because it provides the
maritime equivalent of what strategist Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie Jr., USN,
described as “the man on the scene with the gun.”49 The possibility of a ship arriving and the actual physical presence of one already operating in theater affect
the adversary’s operational planning in fundamentally different ways. Virtual
presence denotes actual absence.
The U.S. Navy struggles with this challenge in the twenty-first century. The
occasional presence of American warships in the waters of the South China Sea
sends important messages—but so does the absence of presence between those
visits. In maritime regions that share many of the hallmarks of hybrid conflicts
of the past, such as the Baltic or the South China Sea, regular naval presence has
been hard to maintain; instead, episodic exercises and occasional patrols have become standard. Strategists considering regions that have the potential to escalate
into hybrid or quasi wars may benefit from considering the same issues regarding
the maintenance of regular presence that Secretary Stoddert addressed.
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Early American naval leaders also discovered that hybrid conflicts usually
offer up multiple adversaries. These adversaries typically have differing motives
for their involvement in the conflict and employ different tactics or operating
concepts. Planners must work actively to understand these differences if they
are to prepare operations effectively. If they appreciate these divergences as a
fundamental part of the maritime challenge, they even can use them as an opportunity. Recent developments of Yemeni rebels deploying coastal-defense missiles raise these kinds of concerns. It is unclear whether the group that fired on
USS Mason (DDG 87) and other American ships in October 2016 did so with the
full knowledge of its proxy supporters.50 In the Quasi War, the French privateers
frequently were more aggressive than the warships, and this complicated some of
the Directory’s efforts to resolve the conflict. The government in Paris eventually
recalled General Desfourneaux, the French governor at Guadeloupe, for being
too antagonistic and aggressive toward the Americans. The maritime militias the
People’s Republic of China has developed have the potential to impose similar
complications on their alleged supporters and commanders.51 There is potential
that the militias, operating under the assumption that People’s Liberation Army
Navy forces will support them, will become more aggressive than their government expects, and they may place China in an untenable position. American and
allied planners must understand not only that this possibility exists but also how
to identify it when it happens.
Likewise, partners and allies constitute a complicated element of hybrid conflicts.
Just as with potential adversaries, most partners bring their own goals and their
own limitations to a conflict. These sometimes will make cooperation difficult, and
even may be counterproductive to American interests. This will be particularly
true when neither side sees an existential challenge, but instead perceives a slow
“salami slicing.” Balancing the differing interests of partners and allies will require
just as much attention as understanding the motives of and differences among
adversaries. U.S. interests already have experienced this challenge in recent years
with the developments in the Philippines. Asking explicit questions about the
interests of potential partners also raises important considerations about other
nations, such as India or Vietnam, whose interests appear on the surface to match
those of the United States but may not connect at a deeper political level. This
truism may seem obvious when one reads it in an academic journal, but strategists
and planners sometimes overlook it when they work from an American-centric
view of the world and the country’s challenges, as issues of rules of engagement,
caveats, and relationships from Afghanistan have shown.52
Finally, the force architecture that commanders employ in the gray zone
requires a hard examination of the capabilities available and the best way to
balance the force employed. Large, powerful warships offer important deterrent
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/6
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effects and address the challenges of survivability and force protection. However,
they also tend to be inefficient and operationally limited when engaged in
missions that fall short of war between major powers or ship-on-ship battles.
Likewise, their expense results in smaller numbers, which adds to the presence
challenge. Early American naval leaders were forced to recognize that small
combatants are a vital part of the mix needed to address the myriad capabilities
that hybrid adversaries may deploy. The large, forty-four-gun superfrigates
such as Constitution were superior in a fight with other warships and eminently
survivable; however, they had significant operational and acquisition limitations.
Recent discussions of force architecture and fleet design in the U.S. Navy have
focused on the big numbers—a 350-ship fleet, and how many large, powerful,
guided-missile destroyers and globe-spanning aircraft carriers should be
included.53 But if the U.S. Navy is going to prepare itself for the hybrid maritime
conflicts of the future, it should remember the experience of the quasi wars of
the past and recognize the insistent need for small combatants as a fundamental
part of a balanced fleet.
In his Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Admiral John M.
Richardson suggests that today’s challenges “will require us to reexamine our
approaches in every aspect of our operations,” but he immediately goes on to
remind sailors that “as we change in many areas, it is important to remember that
there will also be constants.” The Chief of Naval Operations wrote that the best
way to identify these constants and to balance them against the ever-changing
character of conflict is to “[b]egin problem definition by studying history.”54
While this call to historical context and wisdom appears fresh and new, Professor
Andrew Lambert has written that the very founding of the academic discipline
of naval history was “driven by the requirements of naval education, doctrinal
development, and strategic reflection.”55 It is natural that, to understand our
present, we should return to the maritime past.56
History provides an important starting point for the examination of these
kinds of challenges in the modern day. The suggestion that twenty-first-century
threats are unprecedented or that consideration of them cannot be informed by
experience does not stand up to critical scrutiny. However, it also is important
to understand that there are limitations to historical analogy and the use of
historical study in military strategy. Modern planners, policy makers, and naval
officers will not find “school solutions” or easy answers derived from the study of
America’s first maritime hybrid war. Instead, the observations that can be made
from studying history may help refine the questions asked and the assumptions
made, so as to develop better the underlying principles of a strategy or operational
concept. As Alfred Thayer Mahan himself wrote, “The instruction derived from
the past must be supplemented by a particularized study of the indications of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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the future.”57 The character of war is ever changing, even if parallels continue to
resonate, and historical study offers us ways to build frames of reference, context,
and background knowledge.
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